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On David Miller on immigration control
Chandran Kukathas*
Department of Government, London School of Economics, London, UK
David Miller offers a liberal realist defence of immigration control
grounded in cosmopolitan ideals of self-determination, fairness and integra-
tion. But a commitment to liberal values requires a commitment to more
open borders than he admits. A part of the problem is that the notion of
open borders Miller criticises is under-theorised. A deeper problem is that
immigration control itself is inconsistent with important liberal values –
notably the values of freedom and equality. This is a concern because it is
the freedom and equality not only of immigrants but also of citizens that is
threatened by the closing of borders.
Keywords: realism; immigration; control; Miller; borders
In Strangers in Our Midst David Miller supplies liberal democratic states with
a defence of immigration control resting on four basic values: weak cosmopoli-
tanism, self-determination, fairness and integration. The theory he proposes is
grounded in a realist perspective. While an ideal society might not need to
address the question of immigration if it assumes that people have no reason
to move, actual societies today must confront the reality of human movement.
In these circumstances, liberal democracies cannot evade the question of
whether, and the problem of how, to control immigration. Or at least, so David
Miller maintains.
Let me recognise at the outset that in defending his view, David Miller
offers us a theory that is remarkably consistent not only within the terms set
by the book but also within the broader context of his own thinking as a politi-
cal philosopher who has addressed a range of fundamental topics over some
40 years, beginning with his ﬁrst book on Social Justice. His is a democratic,
market-socialist and communitarian-nationalist perspective that regards the
modern state both as the instrument by which justice and fairness are secured,
and the exemplary form of political association through which community is
sustained and the forces that threaten social unity are kept at bay. Immigration
control is one of a number of tools at the disposal of the state, and one that it
must deploy to serve its purpose: to secure the well-being of the community it
embodies.
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As a realist, but also as a political philosopher, Miller’s aim is not to pro-
vide detailed policy prescriptions since these will vary with time and circum-
stance, but to explain why immigration control is necessary. In so doing, he
steers a course between liberal advocates of ‘open borders’ and those national-
ists who would keep borders always tightly closed even when refugees and
victims of natural and human disaster ask for sanctuary or shelter. His commit-
ment to self-determination and integration leads him to part company with
open border liberals, while his weak cosmopolitanism, with its emphasis on
fairness, puts him at odds with the more conservative end of the political
spectrum.
The question I want to raise is whether this via media between extremes is
sustainable. The thesis I wish to advance is that it is not, and that any substan-
tial commitment to liberal values (which David Miller professes) makes it
necessary to move towards a regime of more open borders.
To see this, we should begin with some deﬁnitional issues, which remain
surprisingly unaddressed in Miller’s book. Most obviously we need to be clear
what is to be understood by ‘open borders’. It is not enough to suggest, as
Miller does on a number of occasions, that it means a ‘free-for-all’ – whatever
that might mean. Nor will it do to say, as I think the book’s analysis some-
times implies, that borders are either open or closed – for it is not clear what
that could mean either.
National borders are notional boundaries demarcating the territorially
deﬁned jurisdictional limits of states. The international recognition of borders
means that states have the right not simply to exclude people from entering
their territories but also to determine the terms on which they may enter and
remain. This is not, however, a straightforward matter, since international law
complicates to a signiﬁcant degree the authority of a state to set the conditions
of entry, or even to exclude non-nationals from its territory. The 144 states that
are signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention are constrained, at least to the
extent that they have ratiﬁed the Convention, by the terms of the agreement,
which requires them to admit, consider and if the law after due process
demands, grant residence to people seeking asylum. States may also be limited
by their own internal laws or norms in ways that they cannot easily repudiate.
For example, the member states of the EU cannot exclude each other’s citizens
from entering, or residing or working within their borders. Saudi Arabia is lim-
ited in its authority to deny Muslim pilgrims the freedom to come to Mecca.
And Israel, under the terms of its own constitution, is obligated to admit per-
sons of Jewish ancestry. Borders demarcate territory and help identify or distin-
guish national authorities; but they do not determine the shape or extent of
authority or settle the question of the form or limits of its control. Just as rights
of ownership cannot be assumed to be those held under the terms of fee simple
property, neither can jurisdictional authority be understood without considering
the context of international law and political history.
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No borders are completely open and none are completely closed. This is
true not only as a matter of law but also in practice. Every national jurisdiction
sees people entering and leaving all the time, whether as diplomats, or tourists,
or students, or pilots and ﬂight attendants or traders. Not even North Korea
excludes everyone. Many, if not most, states welcome border crossings, both
because they want their own nationals to be able to leave and return (particu-
larly if it is economically advantageous, and also for military purposes) and
because they want the revenue brought by tourism and trade. What they wish
to limit and control is not so much the number of crossings but the activities
of those who do enter the territory of the state. In particular, they wish to con-
trol participation in the labour market and residency. They want the hotels full
but the neighbourhoods quiet.
The question then is not whether borders should be open or closed but
how open or closed they should be. There are a number of ways in which bor-
ders might be made more open – or closed. They could be opened by states
allowing more people to enter the territory; or by states giving those who enter
a greater range of rights or freedoms (to work, to reside, to set up business, to
trade or to study, e.g.); or by states making it easier for those who come to live
and work to become members or citizens of the state. Borders become more
closed when fewer people become eligible for tourist visas, or fewer work per-
mits are issued or spouses of would-be immigrants are not granted an auto-
matic right to work; or when acquiring citizenship remains difﬁcult for those
who have settled. The case for opening borders is a case for reducing the barri-
ers not only to entry but also to participation and membership of a society.
The case for closing borders is generally a case not for eliminating border
crossings but for limiting entry by some categories of people and restricting
the legal rights of others allowed in (Kukathas, 2010).
Much of Strangers in Our Midst is devoted, strangely, to defending the
claim that the state has the right to exclude. Given that the book proclaims its
realist assumptions, it is not clear why this is necessary. States have certain
rights in law to determine who may or may not enter, and what rights those
who do so enjoy. From a realist perspective, there is no further need to justify
this: we live in a world of states and states have the authority and usually also
the capacity to control their borders. Better from this starting point to turn to
the question of whether they should exercise this power to open or close their
borders, and how open those borders should be.
At this point, however, Miller’s contribution is more limited than I would
like. Having said that he does not wish to get into detailed policy prescriptions,
because these are going to be highly dependent on particularly circumstances,
he leaves us with a rather vague and incomplete understanding of where he
stands on the question of the extent to which borders should be open. Let us
agree, having granted the realist premise, that states have the right to control
immigration. What does this mean for a state like the UK, whose government
has set a target (unrealised over the past 5 years) of 100,000 net immigrants
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per year, and also proposed to take in 20,000 Syrian refugees over the coming
5 years? Germany has committed itself to accepting as many as 800,000 refu-
gees a year for the foreseeable future. Are the UK government’s measures clos-
ing the borders to an appropriate degree? Or are they leaving the borders
dangerously open? Is Germany, by taking in so many (assuming the policy
stays in place) moving towards an immigration policy that is no more than a
free-for-all? My point here is not that Miller needs to be writing a work with
detailed policy prescriptions, but that the abstract theory proposed does not tell
us much about what exactly it is he is advocating. He proposes a via media
between completely open borders and completely closed ones, but that medium
between extremes is occupied by almost everyone, so more needs to be said if
we are to understand where he stands in relation to others debating this matter.
Now it could be argued that what Miller offers is a set of reasons or con-
siderations that should help us draw appropriate conclusions when particular
circumstances are taken into account. To the open border liberal, he is saying:
the borders cannot be completely open, for there are reasons to exclude some
people – to protect the fairness and integrity of a society. And this is ﬁne as
far as it goes. But it does not really tell us very much without some concrete
examples. As it stands, it looks to me as though one could use Miller’s princi-
ples and reasoning to defend the current level of immigration to the UK
(300,000 net immigrants each year), or the Conservative government’s target
of 100,000 net immigrants per annum, or the UKIP proposal to reduce
immigration further still, or a policy that limits immigration to 1 million net
immigrants each year.
Let me set aside my grumbles about these uncertainties to turn to a deeper
concern about the defensibility of a via media between the extremes of open
and closed borders if liberal values are to be sustained. The values Miller
wants to protect are weak cosmopolitan commitments to fairness within the
limits set by the imperative to maintain social integrity. What I would like to
draw attention to is the tension between these different values.
If one’s concern is with the protection of basic liberal values, two candidates
are pre-eminent: freedom and equality. The question is whether immigration con-
trol helps us protect these values or endangers them. Immigration control, as
Miller envisages it, protects liberal values by reducing the extent to which the
inﬂux of people is capable of transforming society by overwhelming local tradi-
tions or practices. As I noted earlier, this control is exercised not simply by
restricting the numbers of people entering a society but by limiting what they
may do. Entering as a tourist may be ﬁne, but coming to work may not. This
control also involves determining who may come to work or reside and who
may not. But control threatens both freedom and equality – and here I mean only
the freedom and equality of existing citizens and residents since we are leaving
the interests of would-be immigrants out of the equation for the moment.
Freedom is endangered to the extent that immigration control requires the
regulation and monitoring not simply of potential immigrants but of citizens
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and residents since the point of control if not merely to turn people away at
the border but to prevent those who have entered the country from working, or
overstaying, or studying or setting up business. Since the local population is
all too ready to employ, trade with or rent to outsiders, this means greater
monitoring and regulation of the local population. As UK Prime Minister,
David Cameron, noted during the Calais crisis, the answer is to strengthen the
‘internal borders’ by making it harder for people to get bank accounts, or to
rent property or move undetected in their efforts to evade deportation. But this
means it is necessary to extend the scope of state regulation and surveillance.
It means patrol vans moving through neighbourhoods, inspections of employ-
ers, sweeps through suspected areas or professions and rules that make it more
difﬁcult not only for immigrants but also residents to operate. It means that
universities have to report to the Home Ofﬁce on their students and foreign
staff to make sure their records track the movement of everyone.
Equality is endangered most immediately in a couple of ways. First, given
that the state will have tried to protect liberal values by controlling not only
the number of immigrants but also the source of migration, some ethnic and
cultural groups will be more likely be suspected of harbouring people not
authorised to remain. The result will be that some ethnic communities will feel
the force of immigration control more than others. Between 1930 and 2005
more than one million US citizens were deported from their own country
because they were suspected of being illegal immigrants – mostly suspected of
being Mexican (Motomura, 2014, p. 41). The pressure to reduce immigration
and the decision to deport resulted in American citizens who looked like Mexi-
cans being sent to a foreign country, even though many of them came from
families who had lived in the United States for generations. (The deportation
of Americans continues even today.) Second, in order to protect the integrity
of the social order, the state will end up choosing immigrants by excluding on
the grounds of culture, ethnicity or race – albeit by ﬁnding ofﬁcial proxies that
do not show the discrimination directly. This means not only treating would-be
immigrants unequally but also treating citizens and residents unequally. Those
from favoured ethnicities will ﬁnd it easier to bring in relatives or to hire from
abroad, while those from minority communities will face greater difﬁculty.
There is, however, an even more troubling side to this. The history of
immigration control, notably in liberal democracies, is a history of the exclu-
sion of people of particular ethnicities or races. The infamous ‘White Australia
Policy’ is not an outlier in this regard. The attempt to control immigration to
America from the mid-nineteenth century was equally explicitly to maintain
the whiteness of the population, and foreigners were differentiated on the basis
of their ﬁtness for citizenship by being distinguished on the basis of colour.
After the passing of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which reinforced ear-
lier forms of legislation limiting Chinese immigration, American Governments
passed more and more legislation to exclude would-be immigrants from Japan,
then Korea and then Asia more generally. Immigration control on the basis of
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ethnicity or race was extended further from the middle of the twentieth century
with increasing restrictions on Mexican immigration. The ideology underpin-
ning this was the view that Europeans entering the country were Americans in
waiting, but other races were not.
It is, of course, entirely possible, to argue for a non-discriminatory immi-
gration policy, and it is clear enough that this is what David Miller favours.
The problem here, however, is that there is a dilemma that faces any liberal
egalitarian opposed to discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or race. If
among the purposes of immigration control is the preservation of ‘integrity’,
the most likely strategy would have to be restricting admission or entry or citi-
zenship to people of similar cultural values – which would mean discriminat-
ing on the basis of ethnicity or race. This would be undesirable because it
means discriminating against would-be immigrants on grounds of race or eth-
nicity as well as against those citizens or residents who would not have the
same opportunity to sponsor people of their cultural or ethnic background to
come to the country. Yet, if it is deemed inadmissible to discriminate on the
basis of such characteristics, and immigration is controlled simply by lowering
the numbers of people entering or taking up citizenship, the goal of preserving
integrity may be compromised since people from different cultures could still
be admitted – unless, that is, immigration were reduced to such negligible
amounts that too few people were admitted to make any discernible difference.
(It bears noting here that if the measure of immigration intake is ‘net immigra-
tion’ a non-discriminatory policy could still involve admitting many people
from diverse backgrounds, the numbers entering offset by the number of peo-
ple leaving.) In reality, most Western liberal democracies discriminate on the
basis of culture or race or ethnicity by some proxy measure since it would be
unseemly to state openly that the policy aims to do so.
Immigration control is control. I think David Miller’s case for control
underappreciates this fact. The more open one’s borders are, the weaker is the
imperative to control; the more closed they are, the greater the extent to which
control is needed, not just of outsiders but of insiders. The attempt to sustain a
regime of control will have unintended consequences – some of them practical
in nature; others, ethical.
Joseph Carens famously opened his classic paper on open borders with the
observation that borders have guards and guards have guns (Carens, 1987,
p. 251). What he did not fully recognise is that those guards are not just at the
border and that the guns mostly face inwards. Miller may have made the same
mistake.
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